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Over the past fifteen years the Cambodian Northwest has been a theatre of dramatic agrarian 
expansion from the central rice plain towards the peripheral uplands. This movement has led to 
massive deforestation associated with the creation of a new agrarian system based upon subsistence 
and commercial crop production (Pilgrim, Ngin, and Diepart 2012; Chheang and Dulioust 2012; 
Dupuis 2008). 
 
Land pioneering into peripheral uplands has been associated with voluntary migrations of a very large 
population from all across the country. This migrant population comes particularly from the rice plain 
provinces where the growing population density has outstripped the capacity of farmers to secure 
livelihoods solely from rice production. The forest land being cleared and cultivated is mainly by 
peasant households. It is not the result of agro-industrial economic land concessions granted to 
companies as is the case in other parts of Cambodia. This migration can be seen as an expression of 
peasant household’s agency in responding to rural poverty (Pilgrim, Ngin, and Diepart 2012). 
 
The mode of production in these new agricultural systems combine different types of commercial 
links between agro-industrial groups (provision of agricultural inputs and credit or via a guaranteed 
purchase of production) and the households who remain the owners of the land. These agrarian 
transformations reflect the integration of Cambodia’s State and rural economy into supra-national 
agricultural markets dominated by agro-industrial groups. In a wider economic context, the setting for 
this transformation is the inclusion of the region in the “Ho Chi Minh-Bangkok” Greater Mekong 
Sub-region development corridors (Royal Government of Cambodia 2011). 
 
As in other countries in Southeast Asia this agricultural expansion into marginal areas is built on the 
political will of the State to exercise his authority over its population and to position itself in regional 
and global markets vis-à-vis the neighbouring nations (Déry 1996; De Koninck 2006).  
 
This research paper is part of an overall endeavour to understand the role and place of peasantries in 
the dynamics of agrarian expansion. In a context where, globally, capital and markets have become 
the organizing principle of the agrarian political economy (McMichael 2008) we are particularly 
interested in examining the nature of relations between peasantry and the Cambodian State. These 
relations are scrutinized through the processes of land control we see as strategies and practices that 
aim to fix, consolidate and legitimize the access to land and its resources (Peluso and Lund 2011).  
 
We suggest that over the history of the Cambodian Northwest, control over the access to land was and 
continues to be an important element in the exercise of power by State institutions at different levels. 
Given the dialectical relations between access to land, power and authority (Sikor and Lund 2009), the 
examination of struggle and strategies of land control in which peasant and the State are engaged 
reveal a great deal about peasant mobilization processes and contemporary State formation. 
 
As the region was the cradle of the Khmer Rouge uprising in the sixties and the rear base of their 
resistance against governmental forces in the eighties and nineties (Vickery 1984; Gottesman 2003), 
this contribution also aims to contribute to better understanding how neo-liberalism plays and how it 






1 Shaping the Argument 
 
Social and environmental processes occur over different scales. The study of society–environment 
relations can be improved by analyzing these cross scale structures and varying scalar configurations 
of interactions (Engel-Di Mauro 2009). We propose to outline a conceptual framework that allows a 
better understanding of those processes linking political institutions dynamics and their relation to 
land across temporal/spatial scales. First an historical perspective is taken to focus on the long term 
systemic character of people-environment relations and the organizing principles of agrarian political 
economy (Peemans 2010; McMichael 2008; Wallerstein 2006). Second we then take a more context-
sensitive political ecology approach to highlight the diversity of recent and local land control 
processes. 
 
A Genealogy of Power Systems and Land Control Strategies in the Northwest 
Setting agricultural colonization in a longer time frame is crucial to understanding its origin and to 
capture the “historical personality” of the actors involved. This will help to describe the evolution of 
the current socio-economic processes. We address this genealogy at a supra-national level in order to 
describe how Northwestern Cambodian peasant trajectories were conditioned by the world history. 
 
First, we describe the history of the systems of power within which the projects of structuring and 
controlling land of Cambodian North-western territories are situated. The analysis relies on the 
concept of governmentality developed by Michel Foucault (Foucault 2004) who differentiates 
between three main systems of power with distinct purposes, targets, knowledge base, strategies and 
instruments. These three are sovereignty, discipline and government. Sovereignty rests on the absolute 
authority detained and legitimised through juridico-legal techniques on a territory and consequently 
on the people who inhabit it. It is circular in that its purpose is the protection and the extension of the 
sovereign authority on its territory and subjects. Discipline does not necessarily challenge the order 
imposed by the sovereign, but it aims primarily at intensifying the instrument and means of coercion 
to normalize the functioning of society to that order (i.e. education, army, civilian administration, 
taxation, etc.). Discipline organizes, rationalizes and hierarchizes territories in components, which can 
be analysed, coordinated and managed according to specific mechanisms and administrative 
instruments (Foucault 2004). In contrast, Foucault argues that the authority exercised by a government 
is part of a radically different system of power. Its purpose is not merely the domination on a territory 
of a group of people but the improvement of the living conditions of an entire population, via 
instruments and mechanisms of security. Foucault does not see sovereignty-discipline-government as 
series of successive elements, the appearance of the government causing the earlier ones to disappear. 
But against the background of European state modernization, Foucault suggests that the line of force 
has constantly led towards the pre-eminence of government over sovereignty and discipline (Foucault 
2004). However, as Tania Li suggests, governmentality allows examination of other geographical and 
historical conjunctures and how these practices of power have articulated elements of government, 
discipline and sovereignty (Li 2007). 
  
Second, we need to describe the evolution of historical practises for controlling the access to land and 
its resources and how these practices have confronted the system of power, in which they are 
embedded. We frame access broadly and view it as all possible means by which a person is able to 
benefit from things (Ribot and Peluso L. 2005). It includes direct or indirect channels, legal or illicit 
ones; it obviously involves a diversity of state, market, military and corporate actors. To take this 
plurality into account, we examine three processes of “controlling the access” to land. First the fixing 
of land enclosure (control over land per se), second the levee of agricultural taxes (control over 
production and labour processes) and finally the commoditization of land and natural resources 





Land Control Processes at Local Level 
Power and land control practises translate locally into contextualized forms that structure the social 
relations of production involving peasantries with the State and other actors. They depend on the 
historical background, the socio-economic conditions of the communities as well as on the agro-
ecology of their environment. This diversity encourages us to take into account the multiplicity of 
land control strategies at a local level. This research will examine the relationships between peasant 
and local state authorities contextualizing them along with class-based agents evolving in networks. 
These include government technical departments, market corporates and individuals, NGOs, 
development organizations, smugglers, poachers, army groups, etc. 
 
In Cambodia, local political power rests up on a small network of elite actors who are closely 
connected to the representatives of the State at local level. Patronage is the norm and the fabric of 
power and decision making in Khmer villages (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). This offers a window 
to look at the political economy of a peasant society (Popkin 1980). In the context of the agricultural 
colonization, the role of local elite has been decisive in controlling land access for at least two 
reasons. First, they translate or control local interpretation of rules that govern the distribution of land. 
This ability to control the distribution of land is also the capacity to exclude or to limit the access to 
land to certain individuals or groups (Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011). Social inclusions and exclusions are 
two sides of the same coin. The struggles between actors associated with this political subjectivity are 
everyday concerns in these pioneer frontiers. Second, given the significant area of land and the very 
large number of in-migrant families involved in opening the agricultural frontier, the local control 
over land distribution along this process determines mobilization of peasants and the making of new 
territories. To make these processes of peasant mobilization visible we try to illustrate the spatial 
dimension of these land control strategies via maps and to understand the context-specific practices of 
spatial domination associated with these strategies. 
 
As a result of this mobilisation process, the peasants are not politically passive; they take their stand 
on local power and land control rules. This can take various forms and comprises a diversity of 
postures and attitudes, which Kerkvliet clusters under four headings: support, compliance, evasions 
and resistance (Kerkvliet 2009). These forms of “everyday politics” involve two opposite types of 
relations between the peasants and the authority. The process of supporting or complying with norms 
and rules regarding the allocation of resources works to legitimatize, those with the authority to 
implement the rules (Sikor and Lund 2009). In contrast, the process of evading or resisting these rules 
tends to discredit and weaken those with the authority in charge of these rules. 
 
We situate the mechanisms of State formation within the confrontation and/or negotiation between 
both of these contradictory processes. 
 
2 Research Methods 
 
This research draws on two research methods. In addition to the review of a rich literature on the 
Cambodian history, the section on the genealogy of power systems draws on various sources of 
primary documents such as the forest archives of Cambodia that include a large range of old 
administrative documents, forest management regulations, olds maps and travel stories of French 
explorers. A range of documents from the French Protectorate (1863-1954), Sangkum Reastr Niyum 
(1955-1970), People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989) and Royal Government of Cambodia 
(1993-now) were examined as well as the doctorate dissertations of Khmer Rouges leaders. 
 
The analysis of local land control is based upon fieldwork in three villages in Bavel District (map 1), 
located in the province of Battambang near the border with Thailand. It covers an area size of 986 km² 
and comprises a population of 100,000 people according to the 2008 population census (Royal 
Government of Cambodia, 2009). The three villages were selected because they are located on the 
deforestation frontier (map 1) in regions with different agro-ecological and historical backgrounds. 
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randomly reflecting the loose social structuring of Khmer villages at that time. Ebihara has indeed 
argued that there was very little collective or communitarian entities organizing rural communities in 
16th and 17th century Cambodia (Ebihara 1984). In pre-colonial time no strong local power could 
actually develop in the rice-growing villages (Thion 1993).. Villages hidden in the prey had little 
contact with the kampong but were very important for the exploitation of forest resources, for grazing 
and as reserves of agricultural land. They were frequently raided for slaves (Chandler 1998). 
 
The traditional land tenure code (kram) stipulates that the King is the Owner of the land and that 
possession rights on land (paukeas) are given to peasants according to an acquisition-by-the-plough 
principle (Guillou 2006). The limited population pressure on agricultural land, combined with limited 
social cohesion and the absence of fixed territories allowed for free access to land and confer to 
peasant a considerable freedom of movement on the territory (Greve 1993; Aymonier 1904). 
 
In order to place rice production and labour under the effective control of the State, a royal tax of 10% 
was levied on rice production. The chovay srok were authorized to collect tax from their srok; they 
could also mobilize labor for warfare or public works. Access to manpower and rice meant that in 
practice the chovay srok controlled the balance of power in the kingdom (Rungswasdisab 1995; 
Chandler 1998). 
3.2 Pre-Colonial Sovereignty in the Context of Southeast Asian World-Economy 
In the post Angkorian era, the king sovereignty and chovay srok patronage were not the only 
references to power in Cambodia. Well before the arrival of French, Cambodia was under foreign 
economic influence. The relocation in the 14th century of the kingdom capital from Siem Reap to the 
confluence between Mekong and Tonle Sap Rivers is above all associated with the expansion of 
Chinese maritime trade in the whole Southeast Asian region (Vickery 1977; Delaporte and Garnier 
1998). 
 
In full reconstruction after the war with the Birmans, the kingdom of Siam developed a political and 
economic hegemony over the resources in the region (Rungswasdisab 1995). This resulted in the 
development of large commercial trade routes across Lower Mekong Basin and in the recruitment of 
labor in neighboring countries to reinforce its army and to enhance the development of commercial 
export-oriented cash crops. The intervention of Siam in Cambodia at that time is part of that dynamic. 
Commercial routes in Cambodia allowed access to a large diversity of export products such as 
cardamom (Amomum krervanh), high value timber, resin, of Dipterocarpacea trees, wax, ivory, etc. 
that Siam then sold to China and Europe. 
 
However, Siamese expansionism alone does not fully account for Siam domination in the Cambodian 
Northwest during 18th and 19th centuries. Indeed, the economic and territorial control over the 
Northwestern regions of Cambodia was possible due to two internal weaknesses in the then system of 
power. Given the power they detained through rice taxation, certain chovay srok became very 
powerful and relatively independent of Phnom Pehn power (Chandler 1998), particularly in regions 
with a high economic development potential like the Northwest. Taking advantage of these rivalries, 
Siamese power reinforced the antagonisms between Northwestern provinces and the central power in 
Phnom Penh. In 1771-1772, the entire Northwest (Battambang - Siem Reap - Pursat - Kampong Svay) 
is then put under the control and protection of Siam. Northwestern chovay srok granted to Siam the 
right to exploit forest resources in the northwest and the labor force to work on agro-industrial 
plantations in Siam against its military protection (Rungswasdisab 1995). Rungswadisab argues that, 
since 18th century, the northwestern territories have become a zone of refuge for the political 
dissidents opposed to Phnom Penh power (Rungswasdisab 1995).  
3.3 The Discipline of the Colonial Power 
French intervention in Cambodia will materialize in a gradual modernization of administrative 




In 1899, the French army provided Cambodia with a rudimentary forest administration, placed under 
the forest service of Cochinchina. The French army corps, a large consumer of timber at the time, 
commands and organizes the first exploitation of timber (Tectona grandis). The colony wanted to 
enrich its treasury by granting logging licenses and levying sales taxes (Thomas 1999). The very 
liberal model of forest management was not well controlled and resulted very quickly on massive 
forest degradation (Gouvernement Général d'Indochine 1905). In a move to sustain colonial rent over 
forests, the French administration put in place a system of forest reserves, which was completely at 
odds with the rules of traditional land access. Forest reserves were State enclosures where logging 
activities are regulated according to agreement signed between companies and the forest 
administration. Access to these forests was denied for people and their grazing herds (Gouvernement 
Général d'Indochine 1910). 
 
The rules and coercive measures that accompanied the organization of these reserves have two sides. 
First, they give responsibilities to peasants and local authorities for the control and patrol of forests, 
and second they also make any person or group who engages in illegal logging personally accountable 
(and not the person holding the license). Peasants chose passive resistance to these rules and tried to 
evade them by turning to smuggling routes controlled by village authorities and Thai traders (Thomas 
1999). 
 
In order to stimulate rice production, the French introduce land titles (Guillou 2006). In liberalizing 
land markets and favoring access to land for French and urban investors in the Kampong, the 
administration tries to increase the exchange value of land, in order to transfer it to the most 
productive farmers. A new tax system is instituted, which obliged the peasant to pay a certain 
percentage of their production in cash. Henceforth, peasants are obliged to engage the market 
economy by selling part of their production. This h cash economy will also create usury credit 
systems (usurers get preferential conditions at very low interest rate in the bank of the Kampong) and 
will result in the indebtedness of a large number of peasants (Thion 1993). Combined with the 
development of land markets, indebtedness will lead to land dispossession by mortgage or sale and 
the emergence of landlessness, land lease and the creation of agricultural wage labor (Kiernan and 
Boua 1982). 
 
The establishment of forest reserves and the expansion of large land enclosures by urban investors 
who secure their land through the cadastral system established by the French, has now considerably 
reduced the possibility of land expansion. In fact, land access and land concentration associated with 
agrarian class formation were already serious issues in Battambang in the early 20th century. These 
agrarian dynamics are central in the analyses made by future Khmer Rouge leaders in their doctoral 
dissertations (Hou 1955; Khieu 1959; Hu 1965). 
 
In 1907, the restitution of Battambang to Cambodia by Thailand, will initiate waves of migration from 
Kampuchea Krom (Cambodian provinces under Vietnamese control) and from south-west Cambodia 
where demographic pressure on land was already very important (Ministère de l'Information 1965). 
From the early 20th century, immigrations to the Northwest, will exacerbate the pressure on land and 
in the context of the rural economy will reinforce land inequality. The Northwestern countryside is 
gripped by a strong feeling of injustice and insecurity and neither the French nor the royalty 
administrations are able to remedy it. Banditry and looting of resources are rampant, investment in 
education and medical services is nonexistent and any agricultural modernization only benefits the 
elite. The situation eventually reinforces the patronage power of the chovaysroks and their 
connections with Thailand. 
 
Peasant protest will be crystallized in agriculture development and forest management issues. This 
protest is first organized by progressive members of Buddhist clergy (Kiernan 2004) and will later be 
echoed by the « Khmer Issarak » (Free Khmers), an anti-colonialist movement managed by Son Ngoc 
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Thanh and largely supported by Thailand. In the Northwest, the Issarak follows on strong economic 
and political patronage networks and will bring the Thai to the heart of power system in the region1. 
3.4 From the Emergence to the Re-integration of the Khmer Rouge Sovereignty 
Sihanouk politics will not challenge land and forest tenure arrangements established earlier by the 
French. Concession enclosures remain the principal forest management tools and the land titling of 
settlement and agricultural land is pursued. Land markets are still promoted and the investments by 
urban dwellers in the agricultural sectors are encouraged. In the fifties, the support provided by the 
royal government to develop the fertile land of Battambang is an important incentive for the migration 
of a large number of families coming from South-West region (Ministère de l'Information 1965). 
These migrations provide the continuity of the migratory movements initiated in the early 20th 
century between both regions. 
 
In the 1960’s, indebtedness of peasants and their dependency to usurers are generalized (Kiernan 
2004). In reality the socio-economic conditions of peasants at the end of the 1960’s are not essentially 
any different from those that prevailed in the 1920- 30’s (Prud'homme 1969). 
 
From 1966, the Sangkum establishes a new form of agricultural tax (le ramassage du paddy); a 
mandatory contribution, which imposes the peasant to sell a part of their harvest to the government. 
To ensure production does not escape on smuggling routes, the collection of this new tax is supervised 
and enforced by the army especially in regions with high agricultural potential like Battambang. 
Social unrest is sparked by the arrival of new settlers and especially by the acquisition of land already 
in use. Manipulating the local officials and army officers the newcomers assign themselves land titles 
which had recently been cleared by local peasants. They claimed their titles invalidated customary 
possession by occupation (Thion 1993). In 1967 a peasant uprising occurs in the district of Samlaut 
(Battambang) against government officials and the military. The Samlaut episode strongly reinforces 
peasants support of the anti-establishment movement against corruption of local government (Kiernan 
1982). It is in this context that the Khmer Rouge (KR) revolutionary and political movement will 
come to power. 
 
Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) 
The modernization project of Democratic Kampuchea was based on the construction of a nation-state 
and its implementation between 1975 and 1979 was radical. The priority for national development is 
primitive accumulation in the rice sector. The Angkar abolished the right of individual possession of 
land, nationalized the entire agricultural domain and collectivized all means of production. Labor is 
structured and organized within the collective production groups in which the individuals are 
recruited. The urban population living in the kampong is forced to the country side. Forest 
concessions are cancelled and the access to forest is forbidden for the population, which is now 
enrolled in collective farming. These new forms of appropriations of space and the underlying social 
relations radically transform rural territories (Tyner 2008).  
 
The KR cadres in the Nord-West were more like members of a guerrilla movement involved in timber 
trade with Thailand rather than skilled and disciplined administrators of an revolutionary 
administration (Vickery 1984). Out of the control of central KR authority, there were viewed quickly 
by the Angkar as dissidents against the KR establishment. Between 1975 and 1978, migration 
campaigns aiming to “purify” the Northwest are undertaken to replace the northwestern KR cadres 
and military by those of the South-west region who are more obedient to Pol Pot (Kiernan 1996; 
Vickery 1984). Though justified by political reasons, these migrations reinforce and perpetuate the 
already existing links between both regions. 
 
                                                     
1 A man called Keo, a Sino-Khmer assigned by the Thai at the position of Samraong district chief (in the 
Northwest), was an important trade figure between Cambodia, Thailand and China in the 19th century. His 
grand-child, Kao Tak, trader between Cambodia and Thailand and also an ally of the Thai will become a 
close collaborator of Son Ngoc Thanh in the entire Northwest (Kiernan 2004). 
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Khmer Rouge Resistance and Re-integration (1979-1999) 
In 1979, the country is liberated but the Khmer Rouges are entrenched in the Northwest and have 
become a resistance movement against government troops and their Vietnamese allies. Massive 
uncontrolled migratory movements will take place across the entire country in the chaos that followed 
the arrival of Vietnamese army and the Khmer Rouge rush to the Northwest (Vickery 1984). In the 
Northwest, an important group of migrants gathered in refugee’s camps (along the Thai border) from 
where international aid will be organized. These camps had key geopolitical influence in the region as 
they provided support (food aid, civil and military logistics) to political bodies opposed to the Hanoi-
backed Phnom Penh power (i.e. the Khmer Rouge). This support is significant and will contribute to 
giving legitimacy to KR power. Vickery points out that KR leaders are even encouraged by the 
UNTAC to present candidates for the 1993 general elections as part of a multipartite peace agreement 
for Cambodia (Vickery 2007). 
 
As early as 1979, agreements of forest exploitation are made between Khmer Rouges leaders and the 
Thai military in the Northwest. The deal is clear, in exchange of forest exploitation rights, the Thai 
military give the Khmer Rouges access to food aid in the camps and protect their refugees (Le Billon 
2000; Hibou 2004). Approximately fifteen Thai companies who are under a logging ban in Thailand 
will get access to large forest areas in the northwestern territories controlled by the Khmer Rouge 
(Gottesman 2003). The profits derived from these agreements are tremendous and allow the KR to 
finance their resistance war against governmental and Vietnamese troops. But these concessions also 
provide benefit to the government via taxes and royalties. A paradoxical logic of cooperation between 
the (KR and the national army will lead these players to maintain a minimum level of conflict and 
instability in order maintain the access to forest rent (Le Billon 2000). This deal has considerably 
reinforced the relations between Khmer Rouge leaders, some political factions of the government, the 
Thai military as well as business and politicians on both sides of the border (Hibou 2004). This deal 
will further reinforce the legitimacy of Khmer Rouge power in the Northwest. 
 
It is on the basis of these first “joint-ventures” that forest concessions will be [re]established in the 
mid-1980’s, one hundred years after they were first introduced in Cambodia by the French (Le Billon 
2000; Hibou 2004). Without really questioning its rationality , the international community 
encouraged the “rationalization” of forest concessions with the objective to promote public/private 
partnerships between State and private enterprises and to generate revenues and finance post-war 
reconstruction efforts (Hibou 2004). But in the Northwest, these public-private partnerships were 
integrated in the prevailing post-war political economy and so contributed to reinforce KR power.  
 
The 1993 elections bring to power a coalition of two parties: the Cambodian People Party (politically 
opposed to the Khmers Rouge), and the FUNCINPEC lead by Norodom Rannaridh who attempts to 
integrate the Khmer Rouge into the government as a manoeuver to weaken CPP within their coalition 
(Vickery 2007). The reconstruction of patronage networks to control the country will generate violent 
political struggles between both parties. The need for both parties to generate revenue will intensify 
the recourse to forest concessions. In only just a few years, the private-public partnership ideal 
imagined by international community to assist reconstruction has resulted in a generalized and 
uncontrolled privatization of State forests to serve the interests of political and military leaders 
(Global Witness 2007). 
The development of concessionaire economy will support two important processes in the Northwest. 
First, in a move to offer alternative livelihood solutions for demobilized soldiers, both co-prime 
ministers will allocate land to the army. In seven provinces, in July 1994, five percent of the 
Cambodian territory was allocated to the military (Hibou 2004; Global Witness 2007). This will 
strengthen the militarization of natural resources management. Second, the power will progressively 
be centralized and controlled by Hun Sen at the expense of opposition leaders and even rivals within 
the CPP. The army and police are progressively put under his control this results in a fusion between 
economic, political, military, judicial and even religious power at all levels (Marchal 2004). 
 
After the 1998 general election that strengthens Hun Sen’s hold on power, the question of the 
demobilization of governmental and KR soldiers, in the Northwest will be tackled. The strategy was a 
9 
 
political and territorial reintegration (Samaharenekam). Khmers Rouge leaders obtained key positions 
within provincial and district administrations. The share of the territory between the royal army and 
the Khmers Rouge allowed, in a region still under KR control, to put land distribution and 
management in their hands. This carte blanche given to the militaries in the Northwest will not only 
end conflicts but will also renew the legitimacy of KR power and political economy. This 
reintegration marks the opening of the agricultural frontier and creates another incentive for 
migrations. Peasants in need of land come from all parts of the country but mostly from neighboring 
districts and from the southwest, where KR cadres are originally from (Diepart and Dupuis 2012).  
3.5 Neo-liberalism and the Pervasiveness of Sovereign Power 
In early 2000, the forest concession system is at an impasse (Independent Forest Sector Review 2004). 
In 2002, under pressure from the international organizations who promoted it the system is 
progressively reformed and a moratorium on timber exploitation is declared. This decision does not 
mark the end of the concession system. Lead by the government and the forestry administration in 
particular the forest concessions system is gradually transformed in an agro-industrial land 
concessions system. The regional context of these transformations has changed: he emergence of 
Greater Mekong Sub-region development corridors and an increased global interest for large scale 
investment in land and in agriculture prevail (Deininger et al. 2011). Yet, the socio-political 
framework for these new forms of agricultural production remains intact; the extractive agrarian 
political economy based on historical networks developed by KR and Thai actors. 
 
The rapid advance of the pioneer frontier is stimulated by international agro-industrial markets based 
in neighboring countries (Thailand, but also Vietnam, China and South Korea). In Thailand, the 
figurehead of this development is the agro-industrial group CP (Charoen Pokhaphand), a world leader 
in the production of livestock feed. The control over agricultural commodity chains is operated 
upstream and downstream of production, by providing credit for seeds, fertilizers and pesticides and 
through the purchase of agricultural production. The land, distributed by KR strong men as part of the 
reintegration policy, remains the possession of those families. However, the externalities of this 
development (environmental degradation, investment in and management of hydraulic infrastructures, 
transport, and climatic risks during production) are entirely borne by peasants. 
 
The neoliberal modernization of State institutions that provide a framework for the agricultural 
colonization comprise a plethora of new legal instruments. The 2001 land law foresees the 
establishment of private land title and the development of markets towards pro-poor objectives. The 
recent land titling process ( prime minister titling) follows the directive 01 in a move to secure land 
rights for the poor follows on the same logic (Müller and Zülsdorf 2013). The forest concession 
system is gradually replaced by economic land concession for agro-industrial development to bring 
growth and employment in rural areas. Land reform also aims to bring more responsibilities to rural 
communities in forest management through the community-based forest management. Social land 
concessions (co-managed by the state and the communities) are established to address the need of 
land for the rural poor. This institutional context, supposedly new, follows in reality on the French 
jurisdictions and land tenure regimes introduced during the protectorate. These new neoliberal 
governance instruments carry a message of political decentralization, administrative de-concentration 
and resources co-management are undoubtedly instruments of a “government” in the sense of 
Foucault (Foucault 2004). But given the history and practice of the agrarian political economy in the 
region, this devolution of power serves the interest of central power, the agro-industrial lobby and the 
elite within the rural communities (Diepart 2011). Our assertion that decentralized control over land 
responds to a centralized logic of power is aligned with Springer’s argument that in the context of 
neo-liberalization the interpretation of laws by elites has become the main element in the perpetuation 







4 A Diversity of Land Control Strategies at the Local Level 
 
At the local level, land control strategies that confront power and authority, are embedded in a long 
history. But given the highly opportunistic nature of the current agricultural colonization one should 
pay attention to the multiplicity of situations on the ground. Based on field work in Bavel district we 
set forth three case studies that highlight a diversity of local land control practises. Each case accounts 
for a specific process of peasant mobilisation reflecting different socio-economic functions within 
rural societies. 
4.1 Land Access, Migration and Social Differentiation in Prey Thom 
The village of Prey Thom is located on the fertile uplands in the south of Bavel district. This area was 
quickly colonized by farmers after the armed conflict and therefore experienced major landscape 
transformations. The agricultural colonisation was shaped through territorial patronage of Khmer 
Rouge warlords who were in the region at the end of the armed conflicts with the government army. 
They planned and supervised the distribution of land to the migrants arriving in the area; in the early 
phase of the distribution, the rule was to allocate five hectares of forested land to each family. The 
first migrants who arrived after the war (circa 1999) were a mix of demobilized soldiers (from both 
the Khmer Rouge army and regular army) and natives of the area who had fled the war. By 
appropriating the best quality land, these first migrants monopolized the land rent. It allowed them to 
engage in profitable cash crops production activities (maize, soy, cassava, sesame and mung beans) 
controlled by Charoen Pokhaphand (CP). The current land elite of Prey Thom comes from this 
pioneer group of people who benefit from larger land areas and have accumulated important operating 
capital (mostly mechanical equipment). By controlling the agricultural means of production, they 
have had a key role in determining the relations of production of peasant communities. 
 
These pioneers were followed by a group of farmers from various origins that settled according to the 
same rules of land access. They were often linked to the first migrants by family or acquaintance 
networks. These new migrants colonized land located more and more at the periphery of earlier settler 
landholdings. They also bring an important labour force, as the labour demand for forest clearing and 
removing tree stumps quickly increased. In fact agricultural colonization and migration are two 
processes that mutually reinforcing. 
 
In 2004 agricultural expansion and the progressive saturation of land led to the creation of two 
satellite villages, Ou Tan Yien and Kampo Steaw, where a family could receive no more than three 
hectares of poorer quality low-land. As one moves towards the edge of the expanding village the 
quality of land decreases and rice becomes the main cultivated crop. This keeps the peasant out of the 
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The peasants primarily form protective barriers around these large landholdings. And by supporting 
the forest clearance, they support the actual implementation of these large landholdings that became 
agricultural enterprises. Finally, by accepting the domination of the owner, they legitimize and 
support a way of land access that is deeply unequal. Indeed, these patron-client relations are highly 
asymmetric and similar to the enslavement of a part of the peasantry to a sovereign power. Yet, they 
have certain rationality for the actors operating in this territorial context. 
 
The relations between the peasants and the power are clearly based on the support of a Khmer Rouge 
control on land; it implies more than simple acceptance. Even if, on the side of the peasants, this 
support is justified by difficult access to land rather than political affinities, it strengthens a political 
and economic patronage and legitimatizes land control practices. This points the contradiction 
between government KR reintegration policy and the current forest management policies of the same 
government.  
4.3 Resistance and Peasant Struggles in Boeung Pram and Bou Choum 
Boeung Pram and Bou Choum are two villages in Bavel District involved in land conflict. The site of 
current village of Bou Choum was controlled by a Khmer Rouge military commander (Deng Yang), 
who managed the land distribution at the end of the nineties. This included the redistribution of large 
landholdings to close dignitaries (often according to their rank in the army), land sale to businessmen 
and investors in the region and redistribution of small plots to demobilized soldiers or landless 
peasants (according to the KR rule of allocation five hectares per family). In 1998, the first 
households to t settle in Bou Choum are recipients of land distributed by Deng Yang. The first 
inhabitants of the current village of Boeung Pram arrived in the area in 2005 at a time when the land, 
even though unoccupied, was redistributed to military commanders or sold to private individuals. 
These newcomers (demobilized soldiers of the government army, then Khmer Rouge army soldiers) 
quickly organized around a charismatic leader (Chea Ney) to secure these territories for their owners. 
This social unrest and mobilization of peasants is strong. Chea Ney, and e hundreds of peasant 
families, settled by force in the area. Populations from Bou Choum and Boeung Pram mobilize to take 
over land from the large landowners. Their goal is to extend farmland for a growing immigrant rural 
population in desperate need of agricultural land. 
 
The expansion of cultivated domain is limited by the presence of landlords in the area who do not 
permit the encroachment of their landholding. But these communities do not recognize the legitimacy 
of these landlords and the encroachment of a warlord landholding (Srey Poun) eventually occurs. The 
conflict escalates and leads to the arrest of Chea Ney who is charged with illegal deforestation and 
illegal sale of agricultural land. Benefiting from the weakening of Boeung Pram community, Bou 
Choum famers then decide to ally with Srey Poun; the deal was that they would get back the 
agricultural land they originally received from Deng Yang if they help to evict the few families of 
Boeung Pram who are still living on the land. This opportunistic maneuver of Bou Choum people to 
secure their land rights will not succeed as Chea Ney remained very active in his jail cell. He managed 
to mobilize a network of actors to stand up for his cause: influential members of local CPP bureau, the 
district and provincial administration, the forestry and land administrations, local NGOs and even 
human rights lobby groups. On his way out of prison, Chea Ney and his folks will form a small 
guerilla army and will reoccupy, at gun point, the land re-occupy by Bou Choum. But he went further 
and managed to have the Provincial State land management to recognize the contested land as private 
State land. Eventually, the land has been integrated in a social land concession program, which 
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within the peasantry. The Khmer Rouge State nationalized land resources and strictly controlled its 
access, so to force a primitive agrarian accumulation. In the post-conflict reconstruction period, high-
ranking government officials became the central actors in controlling forest enclosures and timber 
market. Under the current neo-liberal modernization, the access to land is adapted to the institutions of 
global food marketing. 
 
Throughout this history the balance of power between State and markets has evolved and with them 
the disciplinary instruments of land control (taxation, enclosures and markets). However, these 
mechanisms have always served a circular sovereign power and have contributed to subordinate 
peasantry to the State and/or market elites. Incarnated by the King, the Protectorate, the Khmer Rouge 
or the post-conflict political leaders, these sovereign systems of power are built on controlling forest 
and agriculture as well as of the people whose lives depend upon them. The emergence of 
government-like power and land control instruments (what we refer to as neoliberal tools) is naturally 
embedded in this historical context of violence. These tools are used by the army, political parties and 
the market. Pilgrim argues that when they are coupled with the threat of force, initially employed by 
the military for territorial acquisition and control in warfare, the neoliberal tools for land management 
and territorial development have become institutionally deviant in the sense that force is legitimized 
by government institution towards private citizens and interests (Pilgrim 2010). 
 
However, peasants are not resigned to passivity in this exercise of power. The history of the region is 
also one of struggles and resistance. The dissidence of the Northwest to the central power of the 
government has favored the political and economic rapprochement between Thailand, local patronage 
networks and trade/smuggling of forest and agricultural products. Driven from Thailand, these 
networks form the basis on which the region penetrates the world agro-industrial markets. In this 
context, migrations are part of continuing process that brought important peasant population to the 
Northwest and also resulted in establishing historical continuity in the relations between regions (in 
particular southwest and northwest). These migrations are aligned with national policies but not 
controlled by government; the peasant household is the main locus of agency in the management of 
these migrations as part of strategies for managing vulnerability. 
 
This history is not without its contradictions. Commercial networks between the Northwest 
Chovaysroks, Thailand and China that nourish social unrest and the resistance against the sovereign 
power of the king and the colony are now the vectors of the agricultural colonization which induce 
inequality within the peasantry. 
  
The case studies focus on the ethnography of land acquisition and how it fosters a diversity of 
circumstances under which land control strategies occurs and their impact on the spatial as well as 
economic structure of the new territories. 
 
At the local level, land control and power are undoubtedly twin forces. Local authorities and warlords 
that emerged after the KR reintegration were legitimized to control land distribution. Some general 
rules were established to frame the land distribution, but the local authority had a lot of discretion to 
implement them. The emerging spatial structure of these new territories is a mosaic of large and small 
land holdings. The large landholdings (considered as KR spoils of war) were usually passed on to 
businessmen through market land transfer (high ranking KR leaders were entrenched and not visible 
anymore). Smaller landholdings were redistributed to migrant households by a local authority 
(representative of the State) or directly by a warlord who acted in a rather Stateless institutional 
context. 
 
The positioning of the peasant vis-à-vis this power is diverse and their attitudes in favor of one or 
another form of land control results in differentiated state formation processes. This case illustrates 
three forms of land control which in turn reflect three types of peasant mobilization: 1) in Prey Thom, 
the peasant accepted the control over the distribution of land by the ex-Khmer Rouge local authority 
and in particular the capture of the land rent by the elite and the socio-economic differentiation 
resulting from it - 2) in Boeung Pram, the peasants demonstrate their support to the KR legacy and to 
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the large land enclosures inherited from reintegration policy even if they remain out of State 
protection – 3) In the Boeung Pram/Bou Choum case, peasant resist to this KR legacy and mobilize to 
create new solutions to land distribution with State actors. There similarities and differences between 
these cases inform our understanding of State formation along the Northwest agricultural frontier.  
 
The first two cases illustrate peasant acceptance or support to the rules under which they receive the 
land from village authority or KR landlord. The resulting peasant mobilization work to legitimate the 
land control practices of the elite; as if an agreement – elsewhere referred to as a contract (Sikor and 
Lund 2009) - would bind the elite and the peasant. Favoritism and exclusions are key components of 
the land distribution process but they are risks for the peasants.  
 
In both cases, the choice of land control is not a deliberate political decision made by the peasants; it 
is an act of opportunism. The factors that influence peasant decision making are highly contingent on 
their livelihood circumstances and on the network that facilitates their migration. The migrations, 
which nourish agricultural colonization, are driven by the necessity to acquire land (push factor) and 
guided by the proximity or distant family-acquaintance networks (pull factors). The prevalence of 
migrants from the neighboring districts and from southwest region of Cambodia is significant and was 
quantified with the 2008 demographic census data (Diepart and Dupuis 2012). Opportunism is key 
and we suggest that the legitimacy of power and the attitude of peasant towards it are not fixed and 
absolute but rather dynamic and changing. In the first two cases, the agreement between a land 
recipient and the elite is negotiated individually between the elite and the household, without the 
interference of a community-based institution that would be a defendant of their rights. The absence 
of a solid community mediator tends to reinforce the unbalance between the elite and the peasants. 
 
The outcomes of peasant mobilization regarding State formation are distinct. In Prey Thom (case 1) 
the KR reintegrated the national administration and they are recognized as legitimate authority by the 
Royal Government. In this context, the state develops through the institutionalization of asymmetric 
social relations of production (polarization wage labor/capital) which results from differential land 
control practices. In Boeung Pram (case 2), the process develops in a relatively State less institutional 
context. The Cambodian State does not condemn the large landholdings (this would contradict their 
own KR reintegration policy) but clearly do not approve of them and very likely will not prioritize 
any State projects in the area (social infrastructures, roads, etc.). In the end, peasants undergo a double 
marginalization. 
 
 Case 3 (conflict Boeung Pram – Bou Choum) informs a totally different form of State formation. The 
mobilization of peasant against the KR legacy is driven by a claim on a warlord landholding piece of 
land. The factors that made this protest possible have to do, first of all, with a strong leadership that 
can rally peasant voices. Leadership is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The peasantry also 
needs the support of State institutions (technical line agencies and territorial authority) to materialize 
their protest. The rationality of the State agencies in supporting the protest is to gain some legitimacy 
in these Stateless zones. This is a more effective way to “governmentalize the space” (Peluso and 
Lund 2011). But the State would not venture alone into these hostile lands. It is the convergence of 
interests into a coalition that makes it happen. The State develops through managing conflict and 
requires a technical and social approach that is functional vis-à-vis the neo-liberal policies of the 
government. It needs to be consistent with the new governance instruments (state land classification, 




We have conceptualized State as a flow of relations between people (i.e. peasants) and the elite who 
govern them. Over history land control has been a recurrent process in the exercise of power in the 
Cambodian Northwest and a determinant factor in the relations between Peasants and the State. 
Violence associated with land control practices is inherent to the mechanisms of State formation. The 
acts of violence exercised to maintain order over a territory have always worked to subordinate 
17 
 
peasant to the State or to Markets. In neo-liberalizing Cambodia, the use of several forms of violence 
(military, political and economic) in land and natural resources management has contributed to 
centralizing State power at the national level. 
 
The State being formed along the agricultural frontier in the Northwest is not homogenous and is not 
guided by one vision and rationality. We see the construction of several juxtaposed States each with a 
different historical legitimacy based upon different local power structures. This heterogeneity implies 
different types of peasant mobilization and the simultaneous construction of different forms of rural 
territories. 
 
At the same time there is no obvious political will by the central government to identify the 
contradictions between these different local power structures and to integrate them in a more coherent 
State. Because they are embedded in a centralized agrarian political economy through dense patronage 
network, the fragmented diversity of power systems at local level serves the centralization of power. 
 
In this context, many questions about the very future of peasants remain unanswered. We have 
pointed out the increase of agricultural wage labor as a direct consequence of land and capital 
concentration. The institutionalization of wage labor is the basis on which we can further describe the 
future of the Cambodian peasantry in the Northwest and the agency necessary to tackle the economic, 
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